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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-4038
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
       Appellee
v.
NAIPAUL CHATTERPAUL,
       Appellant
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 04-cr-00381)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a),
September 11, 2006
Before: FUENTES, FISHER, and BRIGHT,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed October 5, 2006)
_____
        OPINION OF THE COURT
         
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Naipaul Chatterpaul challenges his conviction and sentence for
trafficking in counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a).  On appeal, he raises
the issue of whether the District Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence necessary
for conviction based on the argument that the evidence was obtained in connection with
an illegal search.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of
the motion to suppress.
I. Background
On the morning of November 2, 2004, Pennsylvania State Troopers Brian
Henneman and Brian Overcash were sitting in an unmarked police vehicle in the
northbound rest area at Interstate 81, in Penn Township, Cumberland County.  A
handheld radar unit used by the Troopers showed that a Budget truck heading northbound
on the highway was traveling at a speed of seventy-seven miles per hour in a sixty-five
miles per hour zone.  Henneman and Overcash exited the rest area, radioed for back-up
assistance, and followed the Budget truck, which appeared to be following a white box
truck.  After several miles, Henneman and Overcash stopped the Budget truck, and back-
up officers stopped the white box truck.  
  At the suppression hearing conducted by the District Court, Henneman and
Overcash testified that when they approached the Budget truck, Chatterpaul, who was
sitting in the passenger’s seat, and his brother, Chunilall, who had been driving, appeared
“nervous.”  The Chatterpauls presented Henneman and Overcash with a rental agreement
and their New York state driver’s licenses.  The Troopers then returned to the police
vehicle to verify the license and registration information.  
While Henneman checked the information, Overcash spoke to the back-up officers
who informed him that the occupants of the white box truck stated that they were not
traveling with the Budget truck.  Overcash went back to the Budget truck and asked
Chatterpaul and his brother if they were traveling with the white box truck.  The
Chatterpauls stated that they were.  Overcash reported the inconsistency to Henneman
and said, “something is going on . . . we’re going to have to ask some questions.”  (App.,
vol. 2, at 56.)
At the suppression hearing, Overcash provided the following account of what
transpired next:
A. Trooper Henneman prepared a written warning notice for the
speeding violation.  We exited the patrol vehicle.  Trooper
Henneman asked the driver to exit the vehicle.  He was issuing a
written warning to him.  I was actually having a conversation with
the passenger in the vehicle.
Q. Were you able to ascertain who the passenger was?
A. Yeah, he was identified through a New York photo license as
Naipaul Chatterpaul, Richmond Hill, New York.
. . .  
Q. Okay.  Go ahead.  So you indicated that you were having a
discussion with the passenger?
A. Yeah.  I asked him where he was coming from.  I believe he said he
was in Tennessee at some type of convention.  I advised him that,
upon completion of the traffic stop, you know, when Trooper
Henneman had issued the written warning and everything, that he
would be free to go.  And Trooper Henneman finished up with his
written warning notice.  And because Naipaul was actually the renter
4of the vehicle, I feel he’s essentially the owner at that point in time. 
Advising him he was free to go.  I asked him a few more questions
relative to the purpose of his trip, and he said he was selling
handbags.  I asked, what type of handbags?  He said he had various
brands.  I asked him if he would have any problems with me taking a
look at the cargo in the back.  He said he had no problem with that. 
He removed a key.  I don’t know if it was on the ignition or where it
was but he walked to the rear of the box truck and removed a
padlock, unlocked it, opened the door up, and there was numerous
boxes filled in the back.  I inspected the cargo, noticed some Louis
Vuitton handbags, asked Naipaul Chatterpaul–I knew they were
expensive handbags–if they were knock-offs.  First, he didn’t answer
me, but then he related that they were, that he owned a business for a
couple of months, and he traveled around the country, and actually
gave me his next two destinations.  I believe one of which was going
to be in New Orleans, where he was going.  And he sells these
handbags.  At that point, I was sure I was dealing with trademark
counterfeiting issues . . . . 
Id. at 29-31.  Henneman’s testimony at the suppression hearing was consistent with
Overcash’s.  
Chatterpaul and his brother provided a somewhat different account.  They testified
that the Troopers had not returned their driver’s licenses before asking to inspect the back
of the truck, and that it was Overcash, not Chatterpaul, who removed the keys from the
ignition and opened the back of the truck.  Based on this version of events, Chatterpaul
and his brother filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence seized from the back of the
truck.  The District Court denied the motion, concluding that “the police officers involved
had reasonable suspicion to expand their inquiry following the traffic stop and that the
1 Chatterpaul and his brother subsequently entered conditional guilty pleas to
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a), and were sentenced to twelve months of probation, six
months of supervised release, a fine of $200.00 and a $100.00 special assessment. 
Chatterpaul’s brother did not appeal his conviction.
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Defendants gave valid consent for the search of their vehicle.”1  Id. at 133.
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the
motion to suppress.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Our jurisdiction over this appeal is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the
District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual
findings and exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to those
facts.  United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
III. Discussion
Chatterpaul does not contend that the initial traffic stop was unjustified.  What he
does argue is that Henneman and Overcash improperly expanded their inquiry beyond
what was necessary to carry out the traffic citation.  We agree with the District Court’s
determination that Chatterpaul’s argument is without merit.
An officer who develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
may expand the scope of an inquiry beyond the reason for a traffic stop and detain a
vehicle and its occupants for further investigation.  United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452,
458 (3d Cir. 2003).  While “reasonable suspicion” must be more than an inchoate
“hunch,” the Fourth Amendment requires only that the police articulate some minimal,
6objective justification for the investigation.  Id.  Reasonableness is determined in light of
the totality of the circumstances.  Id.   In United States v. Arvizu, the Supreme Court
explained that the totality of the circumstances inquiry “allows officers to draw on their
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained
person.’” 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). 
In this case, Overcash had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity
sufficient to justify asking Chatterpaul additional questions about the purpose of the trip.
At the time, Overcash knew that: (1) Chatterpaul and his brother were speeding; (2) either
Chatterpaul and his brother or the occupants of the white box truck were lying about
whether the two trucks were traveling together; (3) Chatterpaul and his brother appeared
nervous; (4) based on his prior experience in narcotics interdiction, rental trucks are
frequently used to transport illicit drugs or other contraband.  
Taken together, these considerations provided Overcash with a reasonable basis
for expanding the inquiry beyond the initial traffic citation.  See Givan, 320 F.3d at 458-
59 (finding that officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the inquiry where defendant
was speeding in a rental vehicle, appeared nervous, and provided inconsistent statements
about his trip).  Therefore, the inquiry did not, as Chatterpaul contends, constitute an
illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment and did not taint the validity of his
subsequent consent to the search. 
In addition, to the extent that Chatterpaul suggests that his consent to the search
7was the product of duress or coercion, we find that this argument lacks merit as well.  It is
well-settled that a search conducted pursuant to consent is one of the specifically
established exceptions to the search warrant requirement.  Id. at 459.  The voluntariness
of such consent “is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all of the
circumstances.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  We therefore review for clear
error the District Court’s determination that Chatterpaul’s consent was voluntary.  Id.  
Here, there was conflicting testimony at the suppression hearing concerning (1)
whether Overcash requested permission to search the vehicle prior to or after the
Chatterpauls were given back their driver’s licenses and were told that they were free to
leave, and (2) whether it was Henneman or Chatterpaul who actually removed the key
from the ignition and opened the back of the truck.  
In denying the motion to suppress, the District Court presumably credited the
Troopers’ testimony that their request to search the back of the truck was made after they
returned the driver’s licenses and informed the Chatterpauls that they were free to leave,
and did not find any other evidence in the record sufficient to suggest that Chatterpaul’s
consent was anything but freely given.  Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that
the District Court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous.  Rather, there is ample evidence to
support its finding that the consent was voluntary.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the District Court’s decision denying the
motion to suppress.
